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ABSTRACT
We study the joint evolution of worldviews by proposing a model of opinion dynamics, which is inspired in notions from
evolutionary ecology. Agents update their opinion on a specific issue based on their propensity to change – asserted by the
social neighbours – weighted by their mutual similarity on other issues. Agents are, therefore, more influenced by neighbours
with similar worldviews (set of opinions on various issues), resulting in a complex co-evolution of each opinion. Simulations
show that the worldview evolution exhibits events of intermittent polarization when the social network is scale-free. This, in turn,
trigger extreme crashes and surges in the popularity of various opinions. Using the proposed model, we highlight the role of
network structure, bounded rationality of agents, and the role of key influential agents in causing polarization and intermittent
reformation of worldviews on scale-free networks.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Weltanschauung, usually translated from German as "worldview", is a concept popularised by the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel
that refers to the fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society; i.e., the set of statements that are assumed
consciously or unconsciously about the basic make-up of the world12. The worldview and experiences of different individuals
affect each other and, interestingly, co-evolve together. In effect, worldviews drive human behaviour generating experiences
that, in turn, are capable of triggering mutations in the worldview itself. Moreover, interactions between individuals with
heterogeneous worldviews can foster significant mutations in their corresponding inclinations. Therefore, human interaction
has always been a key driver of worldview evolution.
The evolution of worldviews can exhibit fascinating complexity, as seen for e.g. in the evolution of political preferences. In
effect, history shows that political worldviews usually exhibit a life cycle similar to biological organisms: they emerge, maybe
become dominant, only for becoming extinct later3. However, recent trends in liberal democracies have shown that political
worldviews are sometimes capable of reviving after being inactive for a long time4. Moreover, opposing worldviews can coexist
and even reinforce each other, forming a fragile but persistent balance. This phenomenon, known as political polarization, can
lock worldview dynamics until the balance is abruptly disturbed, under events that may be seen very unexpected to external
observers5. Eminent cases of these “surprising events" include the results of the US presidential election of 2016 and the Brexit
referendum in the UK, which suddenly switched the balance in the worldwide political arena.
It is tempting to dismiss abrupt changes in worldviews of societies as rare, idiosyncratic events, just as the spread of
plague or mass extinctions in the 19th century. On this point, it is interesting to note how the development of epidemiology
changed our views on such subjects by enabling the prediction of sudden spreads of diseases6. Similarly, climate catastrophes
like cyclones and floods were first considered to be aberrations, but nowadays advances in meteorology have uncovered
non-linear dependencies that can be leveraged to understand these phenomena7. In a similar fashion, we propose that these
sudden transitions in opinions can be regarded as indicators of a non-linear nature of worldviews’ dynamics. This paper is an
exploration of this rationale.
1.2 State of the art
Most of the literature that studies polarization dynamics has been focused on simulation models (see e.g.8–10). These models
and their variations have emphasized how homophily and confirmation bias can lead to global polarization. These studies find
segregation of like-minded people in 2D space, on which agents interact with their spatial neighbours. However, the role of
"space" and how it affect the herding dynamics in causing polarization is not well-understood.
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Considering that social media technologies have elevated the reach of individual influence from physical to the internet,
modern approaches tend to place agents not in 2D space but rather connect them via various network topologies.The effect of
various topologies was studied in11, where they show that agents converge to one opinion above a critical value of connectivity,
and this critical value decreases when the number of random links are increased over an initially regular network. Opinion
dynamics have also been studied in models where the network structure changes at each time-step12. However, existing results
suggest that it is difficult to isolate the role of topology in these scenarios due to the constant variations.
From a modelling perspective, opinion dynamic models have evolved from simplistic contagion dynamics13, 14 to sophisti-
cated decision making agent based models10, 15, 16. Also, while most models focuses on the evolution of a single opinion, some
body of work have explored the dynamics of collections of opinions. After the early works on cultural segregation reported in8,
researchers have used the features of multi-opinion models to study the evolution of social power17, clustering transitions18 ,
and convergence with bounded confidence19.
Most popular opinion dynamics models and consensus algorithms are such that their evolution tends to reach a single
stationary steady state after some time. However, as observed in reality opinions usually don’t reach a static equilibrium.
Rather they follow a metastable behaviour and can exhibit punctuated equilibrium in time. This non stationary behaviour is
also observed in the "noisy-voter model"20, 21, where the opinion change is governed by two driving parameters: Herding and
Randomness. The model shows weak convergence for very small values of randomness. The added randomness keeps the
system non-stationary. Although the model is able to reproduce some significant results, the added randomness acts as an
extraneous parameter.
1.3 Contribution and manuscript structure
In this article we study worldview dynamics motivated by the ideas from evolutionary ecology. Worldviews are seen as an
encoding of the basic presupposition of a belief systems, being analogous to genes that encode biological signatures of specific
species. Worldviews — just like species — emerge, dominate, and eventually go extinct. Moreover, just as new species are
formed by mutations and interactions of existing species, worldviews emerge out of cross-cultural exchange. Finally, mass
extinctions take place occasionally within ecosystems that eliminate existing species giving way to the emergence of new ones,
which is analogous to sudden worldview shifts.
The mentioned properties of evolutionary biology are captured by the well-known Tangled Nature Model22. This model,
first presented in23 as a simple agent based model of species-species interaction, is successful in showing how interdependent
competition and mutations can lead to mass extinctions, which are followed by a chaotic phase of reformation that leads to a
new state of meta-stable species.
In this work we leverage this model to propose the Tangled Worldview Model of Opinion Dynamics, in which agent’s
worldview is described by a binary vector and their dynamics is driven by a directed network topology. We use this model
to develop our understanding of the role of topology in the formation of opinion’s polarization, and also in the occurrence
of abrupt global changes. Our model shows metastable evolution of worldviews punctuated by sudden abrupt transitions.
Depending upon the network topology, these metastable states exhibit polarization or consensus.
The main findings reported from this model are the following:
1. Network topologies with just a few cycles do not foster polarization, while multiple cycles act as echo-chambers and
reinforce polarization in agents with herding behaviour.
2. An important driver of sudden global reformations are changes in opinion of key agents in social network. These
events trigger a cascade of opinion changes on various issues and a brief period of abrupt reformation, which allow new
worldviews to emerge.
3. Bounded rational agents self-organize into consensus states on topologies with low cycles. However, on networks with
many cycles even highly rational agents self-organize into polarized states.
4. By focusing on the popularity of a particular tagged opinion, the model exhibits noisy voter model-like dynamics (c.f
Section 1.2).
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, Section 2 introduces our proposed model. Then, Section 3 presents
our main findings from explorations on the model. Finally, Section 4 summarises our main conclusions and points to future
research.
2 The model
This section introduces our model for worldview dynamics. In the sequel, first Section 2.1 introduces some basic definitions,
and Section 2.2 discusses the switching strategy used by the agents. Then the implementation of this strategy is explained with
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the help of an example in Section 2.3. Finally, in the following section 2.4, structure of the considered social influence network
is discussed along with the algorithm to generate it.
2.1 Model description
Let us consider a system composed by N social agents, where the internal state of the i-th agent corresponds to the binary
vector (Oi1, . . . ,O
i
K), with O
i
j ∈ {0,1} for all j = 1 . . .K . This vector represents the agent’s worldview: the K entries represents
a particular subject/issue and its value (0 or 1) represents the position (for/against) of the agent on that topic. Note that K is the
number of considered issues within the worldview.
The social influence that agents have over each other is encoded into a social network. Social influence is generally
asymmetric (contrasting with other social interactions like friendships, business etc) and heterogeneous. Hence we assume that
the network of social influences to be represented by the adjacency matrix Ai, j and is weighted by the weights Ci, j ∈ [0,1] to
introduce heterogeneity in the social influence network.
Agents interact with each other in this network, and change their opinions as a consequence of those interactions. This
interaction includes, an agent switching its opinion on a particular issue based on various factors. In our model agents update
their worldviews asynchronously. At each time step one agent is selected randomly, and it selects at random an opinion to
update. In the sequel we consider the major factor that drive their dynamics.
2.1.1 Affinity
This quantity explores the effect of confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency of the agent to favour the opinion of those who agree
with pre-existing opinions of the agents on other issues. The affinity between agent i and j, denoted by Fi, j,is a quantification of
similarity between the worldviews of any two agents say i and j. There can be many ways to quantify this but for the purpose
of this study we simply take the ratio of total number of issues with same opinion to the total number of issues.
Fi, j =
1
K
K
∑
n=0
δ (Oin,O
j
n) (1)
The δ function in the previous equation is defined as follows,
δ (Oin,O
j
n) =
{
1, i f Oin = O
j
n
0, i f Oin 6= O jn
2.1.2 Propensity and conformity
The propensity to change opinion on issue k by agent i , denoted by Pi,k. In our model this metric is calculated as
Pi,k =

∑Nj=0 C j,iFj,i(1−δ (Oik,O
j
k))
∑Nj=0 A j,i(1−δ (Oik,O
j
k))
, i f ∑Nj=0 A j,i 6= 0
0, i f ∑Nj=0 A j,i = 0
(2)
This is a measure of average disagreement of agent i, with all those j who influence it (C j,i 6= 0), on issue k weighted by the
affinity(Fi, j) of their worldviews. In the above equations, 1−δ (Oi,k,O j,k) gives the value 1 every time when Oi,k 6= O j,k. This
in essence quantifies the weighted disagreement. A refers to the adjacency matrix and C refers to the weighted adjacency matrix
of the network structure which is mentioned in the previous subsection.
Whereas, conformity (Ti) is the measure of social conformity agent i enjoys with those who are influenced by it. This metric
is calculated as follows:
Ti =

∑Nj=0 Ci, jFi, j
∑Nj=0 Ai, j
, i f ∑Nj=0 Ai, j 6= 0
0, i f ∑Nj=0 Ai, j = 0
(3)
Here we quantify conformity as the average influence i has on j (Ci, j) weighted by the Affinity (Fi, j) between i and j.
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Figure 1. Effect of the rationality parameter (α) on switching probability. It can be observed that for lower α probability of
switching decreases for slight negative values of social fitness and subsequently increases for slight positive values of social
fitness.
2.1.3 Social Fitness
We introduce Social Fitness, a variable denoted by Hi,k, to quantify the net social conformity enjoyed by an agent i on a
particular issue k. The social fitness is defined as the difference between the "conformity" and "propensity". In essence, social
fitness is a measure of difference between the approval of agent’s followers and those who influence it. Agents therefore are
inclined to change opinion on any given issue in order to maximize social fitness. Therefore, a lower value of social fitness
warrants an opinion change on that particular issue.
Hi,k = Ti−Pi,k (4)
2.2 Switching strategy
At each time step an agent is selected completely at random and the agent chooses one of the issue at random. The agent then
analyses its social fitness on the chosen issue, to consider a change of opinion. The agents follow a probabilistic switching
strategy. This strategy also provides a leeway to incorporate the rationality of agents. In principle, a completely rational
agent will definitely switch on any issue that has negative value of social fitness. However, bounded rational agents might
overestimate or underestimate this value. This error then leads to agents switching on issues they enjoy positive social fitness as
well as keep opinions with negative social fitness with some probability. Therefore, the probability (si,k of agent i switching its
opinion on issue k depends upon the social fitness (Hi,k) and the rationality parameter (α) as,
si,k =
1
1+ exp(αeffHi,k)
with αe f f = Tiα (5)
Here the defined αeff in Equation (5), is an adaptive rationality parameter which is higher for agents with higher conformity.
Whereas, α represents the rationality parameter of the agents or the ability of the agents to process the available information.
For very high α , the switching probability essentially becomes a step function about 0, i.e. the agents switch almost certainly
even for small negative values of social fitness and almost never for positive values. However, as seen in Figure (1) , for
lower values of α , the slope of the distribution around ’0’ becomes less steep. This allows the agent to switch with a finite
probability for some positive values of social fitness as well as not switch at times for some small negative values. This inability
to optimally process the available information allows for a bounded rational behaviour24 which leads to more variability in
behaviour of the agents. The adaptive αeff accounts for the fact that agents with higher social conformity react more efficiently
to the social pressure. Mirta et. al.25 refer to this parameter as a measure of efficiency of flow of information among the agents.
2.3 Example
Let us illustrate how the model works with an example.
At any particular time step an agent is selected, and the network structure around the agent looks as presented in Figure 2.
The agent chooses (randomly) to consider his opinion about issue number 2 (highlighted in the Figure in yellow). As illustrated
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of the model. The agent considers the propensity exerted by the influencers and the
conformity enjoyed with the followers, when deciding to switch on issue number 2. Three of the influencers disagree with the
agent on issue number 2 (represented by red), while only one agrees (represented by blue). All the followers of the agent (those
influenced by the agent) agree with the agent on all given issues (represented in green).
in the figure, 3 agents disagree with the agent on this issue (highlighted in red). For simplicity, we assume that this is the only
issue these agents disagree upon.
The three disagreeing agents exert a social pressure on the agent to change its opinion on this issue. This social pressure
corresponds to the propensity, and is calculated according to (2) as
Pi,2 =
0.4× K−1K +0.4× K−1K +0.5× K−1K
3
. (6)
For example, if K = 8 then Pi,2 ≈ 0.4
The agent also enjoys social conformity with those who are influenced by this agent. For simplicity, let us assume that all
the three agents agree with the agent under consideration on all issues. Thereby, these agents contribute to the social pressure
on the agent to keep his opinion on the issue unchanged. This kind of pressure corresponds to conformity and can be calculated
from (3) as
Ti,2 =
0.2× KK +0.5× KK +0.6× KK
3
. (7)
For K = 8 then Ti,2 ≈ 0.43
Finally, the social fitness of the agent on this issue is Hi,2 = 0.025. Therefore, the switching probability can be calculated as
from (5) to be
si,2 =
1
1+ exp(α×Ti,2Hi,2) . (8)
In particular, if α = 100 then the switching probability is si,2 ≈ 0.26. Therefore the agent will switch its opinion with a
probability of 0.26 and the same procedure is repeated for other agents.
2.4 Network Structure
The diverse set of human interactions drive various emergent consequences, therefore it is imperative to identify the interaction
most relevant to the problem at hand in order to model it mathematically. Literature from social psychology26–28 assert the
fact that social influence plays a leading role in causing opinion change. Therefore for the purpose of this study we consider
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social influence as the primary cause for an agent changing its opinion. In the paragraphs below we describe the simulated
social-influence networks we will be working with. Although there is no clear empirical evidence of what the topology of
human social influence networks is like, it is clear that human societies are heterogeneous and hierarchical. Some agents
are more competent in certain abilities and hence yield more influence over others. This suggests that the distribution of
social influence in social structures follow a Pareto distribution. This assumption is backed by many studies of online social
networks29, 30. Motivated by this discussion, the network of social influence can be empirically expected to be a directed
scale-free network. The following Algorithm 1 describes how such a network is generated for our analysis.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for generating the Adjacency matrix for the social influence network
Initialize the matrices C and A to be null matrices of shape N×N. for i = 1, . . . ,N do
if i≤ n0 then
Set Ai, j = 1 ∀ j ∈ 1, . . . ,n0
else
for k = 1, . . . ,n0 do
Select j randomly such that, j ∈ 1, . . . , i−1 and A j,i 6= 1
i draws a link, j→ i with a probability ∑Nm=0 A j,m
∑Nn=0∑
N
m=0 An,m
end
Set the self link, Ai,i = 1.
To create a back link (cycle), with probability c, draw r uniformly at random between [0,1].
if r < c then
Select j ∈ 1, . . . , i−1 and Ai, j 6= 1.
Set Ai, j = 1.
end
end
for j = 1, . . . ,N do
Draw a random number w from a symmetric beta distribution (α = 5,β = 5) between [0,1]
Set, Ci, j = w×Ai, j
end
end
Note that initially the network has cycles and self loops only among the first 5 agents. More cycles are introduced before
the final step in the proposed algorithm as node i creates a influence link to random node j( j < i) with some probability c. Now
as the node i introduces a "back" link, it automatically completes an influence cycle. This means that influence on any opinion
expressed by agent i travels back to the agent in a loop and reinforces that influence. In a social context these influence loops
are analogous to echo chambers. The probability c behaves as a parameter to control the number of such influence cycles.
In order to introduce a certain degree of heterogeneity of social influences as each influence is different from the other, the
adjacency matrix (A) is then weighted by weights drawn from a symmetric beta (5,5) distribution between [0,1]. The choice of
this distribution is based on the assumption that extreme influences are less likely. The resulting weighted matrix is denoted by
C.
3 Results and analysis
3.1 Method description
For a detailed analysis in this model, a social network (N = 100) of highly rational (α = 100) social agents is considered. The
worldview of these agents comprises of opinions on k = 8 issues. The agents are updated asynchronously, i.e. at each time
step an agent is selected at random and the agent selects an issue at random. Thereafter, the agent updates its opinion on the
selected issue as described in the example above. We record the state of the system after every N× k time steps. The state
of the system is identified by worldview IDs, i.e. the decimal conversion of the binary string of ’k’ bits, for each agent. This
enables us to study the time evolution of both worldviews and individual opinions. The worldview IDs are randomly initialized
for the agents.
Simulations start by generating a social network as described in Algorithm (1). First, we obtain an adjacency matrix, A,
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Figure 3. (a,b,c) Worldview evolution for 100 agents is observed for three different values of back-link probabilities (c = 0,
0.2, 0.5). The horizontal axis of the figure represents the time steps and the vertical axis represents individual agent IDs. The
colours at each time-step indicate the Worldview ID of each agent. It is observed that polarization of worldviews increases with
more back-links as agents self-organize into opposing worldviews. Some sudden transitions are also observed.
(d)The variation of polarization for various values of back-link probability (c). The error bars show the 95% Bootstrap
Confidence Intervals for the mean values obtained by 100 simulations for each value of ’c’.
(100× 100) and the weighted adjacency matrix C. We simulate the dynamics as discussed in the example in the previous
section, on topologies with different back link probabilities (c).
3.2 Polarization and cycles
We first explore the effect of the number of cycles on the opinion dynamics. Figure 3 (a,b,c) illustrates the typical behaviour for
three conditions: c = 0 (No extra back-links), c = 0.2 (A fifth of the agents create a back-link) and c = 0.5 (Half of the agents
create a back-link). As discussed before, back link probability (c) controls for the number of cycles in the social influence
network.
In the first case, it can be observed that most of the agents (60%) have the same worldview, and the opposing views are not
necessarily the polar opposite of the dominant worldview. For instance, the most popular worldview at T = 8000 in this case is
Worldview ID: 243 (Binary representation: ’11110011’) which is adopted by 60 agents. The next most popular worldview is
worldview ID: 56 (Binary representation: ’00111000’) which is popular among only 11 agents. Also, these two worldviews
disagree on some but not all the issues.
However, for c = 0.2, some polarization emerges as a minority of agents hold a worldview which is completely opposite to
the majority worldview. For example, in this case at t = 8000, the most popular worldview ID is 72 (Binary Representation:
’01001000’) which is popular among 70 out of the 100 agents, however there is a significant minority of 27 agents which follow
the worldview ID: 183 (Binary Representation: ’10110111’). Here the majority and the minority disagree on all the issues,
representing a case of group polarization.
Finally in the case of c = 0.5, the majority weakens more and almost half of the population follows a worldview, while
a significant opposition follows a completely opposing worldview. For example, in this cast at t = 8000, the majority of 57
agents believe in worldview ID 254 (Binary Representation: ’11111110’) and the significant minority holds the polar opposite
worldview 1 (Binary Representation: ’00000001’). This observation suggests that the inclusion of cycles/back-links can indeed
lead to this emergent global polarization.
Therefore to measure this it is imperative to discuss a measure of polarization we use to quantify polarization at any given
state of the system. Consider the state of the system at any time t is given by n1 : w1,n2 : w2...., i.e. ni agents with worldviews
wi. Suppose the most popular worldview is w j, followed by n j agents and the second most popular worldview is wk, followed
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by nk agents. We define
Pol =
d(wk,w j)×nk
n j
Where, d(wk,w j) =
1
K
K
∑
n=0
(1−δ (Okn,O jn)) (9)
as a metric of polarization. Above, the function d(wk,w j) gives the hamming distance between the worldviews k and j,
and N represents the total number of agents. For example, if the system gets into a state where half of the population has an
opposite worldview as the other half, then Pol = 1. On the other hand, if system gets into a state where all the agents have the
same worldview, Pol = 0.
The average polarization for 17000 timesteps over 100 simulations for various values of back-link probabilities c is
calculated. Figure 3 (d) shows a slow but continuous increase of polarization with the back link probability, confirming that
cycles are associated with polarization.
A back-link completes an influence cycle and hence creates an echo chamber. When the agents, their influencers and their
followers, have the same worldview, the probability of anyone in the echo-chamber to change opinion an any issue becomes
very small.
In summary, polarization can be said to be the result of agents’ trying to minimize propensity (or maximize social fitness).
By recalling equation (2), agents can do this in two ways: either by coming to the same worldview as all its neighbours (thus
there is no disagreement on any issue), or by taking the completely opposite worldview, in which case the fractional similarity
of the worldviews goes to zero and consequentially, the propensity.
In the c = 0 case, agents initially get into a polarized state to minimize propensity. But the absence of any cycles (i.e.
echo-chambers), eventually a dominant majority is always established. However, as soon as echo chambers are introduced, then
agents tend to stay in polarized states. Transitions are triggered by rare changes of opinions by key agents, causing the system
to reorganize in a different polarized state.
3.3 Sudden transitions
Simulations show sudden transitions of worldviews, which can be seen in Figure 3(c) (3 transitions), and also in 3(a) (2
transitions). Note that these transitions are rare, as they occur when certain key agents (usually the ones with high influence)
change their opinion on certain issue and thereafter triggering a cascade of opinion changes. After the cascade the system
self-reorganizes in a different meta-stable state, which remains with minor fluctuations until another transition is triggered. This
is related to the sigmoidal nature of the switching probability, as agents with very high social conformity and positive social
fitness have a small yet non-zero probability of switching their opinion on any issue.
3.4 The effect of rationality
To study the role of rationality parameter (α), we consider networks for the cases c = 0 and c = 0.5. The worldview evolution
for both network topologies for α = 70 is shown in the Figure (4). When comparing this with the worldview evolution
corresponding to α = 100 in Figure (3), it can be observed that the consensus is enhanced for lower α for c = 0 but has an
opposite effect for c = 0.5. To quantify this, we calculate the average number of agents following the most popular worldview
(Mean Consensus) for various values of efficiency parameter (α), for over a 100 simulations in both cases. The Figure 4(c),
shows the variation of mean consensus population with the rationality parameter for both topologies. It is observed that for
c = 0, the mean consensus overshoots half the size of the population, quickly for a lower value of critical rationality than for
c = 0.5. However, for c = 0.5, the transition is more similar to that in Ising model1, where the consensus quickly rises to the
maximum value of half the population after the critical value of rationality.
3.5 Dynamics of individual opinions
We now discuss the dynamics of opinions on individual issues. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of a particular opinion on issue ’5’
in the three discussed values of the cycle parameter (c).
The dynamics in the case of consensus topologies (c= 0 and c= 0.2) shows that variation in popularity of opinions changes
very slightly and sudden surges/crashes happen when there is a sudden transition as discussed in previous sections. However, in
the case of polarized topology the popularity of opinion shows much more variability as well along with more flash crashes and
surges. This volatility can be attributed to the frustration introduced by polarization, as some agents, which are influenced by
both poles, tend to switch back and forth.
On the other hand, in a consensus topology, where the other pole doesn’t exist, the popularity doesn’t change much during a
meta-stable state. In the consensus case, one can observe aperiodic transitions between popular and unpopular phases if a long
term evolution is considered, as illustrated in Figure 5.
1A mathematical model of ferromagnetism in Statistical Physics
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(a) Worldview evolution (c = 0, α = 70)
(b) Worldview evolution (c = 0.5, α = 70)
(c) Variation of Mean Consensus with α
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Figure 4. (a,b) Worldview evolution for agents with same rationality parameter on different topologies (c = 0 , c = 0.5). It is
observed that More polarization and more transitions are observed in (c = 0.5) for lower value of rationality.
(c) The effect of decreasing the rationality parameter on mean consensus population for 17000 time sweeps (100 simulations).
Error bars represent the 95% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals.
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Figure 5. Time evolution of number of agents in favour of issue number 6. Sudden surges are seen during worldview
transitions in consensus topologies (c = 0, c = 0.2). However, the variation of opinions is much more continuous, with flash
crashes/surges, in polarized topology (c = 0.5)
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For certain parameters, this behaviour is concurrent with the behaviour observed in the noisy voter model21, which
successfully explained the volatility clustering in opinion models. Therefore, the proposed Tangled Worldview Model, provides
a much more general framework to study opinion dynamics.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a stochastic model for the dynamics and co-evolution of the worldview of agents that participate in a social
network. This formalism successfully captures highly non-trivial macroscopic social phenomenon, including polarization,
sudden worldview transitions, and the effect of rationality of agents. The observed dynamics of opinions shows a intermittent
behaviour with sudden changes related to worldview transitions.
We discussed the role of network topology in generating and sustaining polarization, given the herding dynamics of the
model. It was observed that social influence networks with cycles reinforce and facilitate polarization. Conversely, networks
with less cycles and more tree like (hierarchical) structure facilitate consensus. This finding also provides a possible explanation
for the tree like organizational structure observed in most organizations. Such a network structure facilitates the flow of
command and propagation of values of the particular organization. This finding also helps in explaining the cultural segregation
observed in8 and polarization observed in10, 16. These models considered the social topology to be either an undirected 2D grid
or completely connected. Both of these topologies facilitate in polarization/segregation as they have multiple cycles. Although
there is no denying the fact that local preferential herding driven by homophily is one of the prime drivers of polarization. The
findings of this paper suggest that cycles in social networks restrict the system in reaching complete consensus. However, if
these cycles are reduced consensus becomes possible even in presence of preferential herding behaviour like homophily.
It is also observed that sudden transitions in prevailing worldviews are possible even when absolutely no changes in
behaviour of the agents, or the network topology are considered. This finding exposes the crucial role of the network topology,
and the relevance of certain key influential agents in the social structure. In particular, sudden transitions were found to be
usually attributed to influential agents that change opinion on a particular issue and consequently trigger a cascade of opinions
on all issues. This leads to an abrupt major rearrangement, which relaxes temporally into another meta-stable state. This sort
of dynamics could explains the punctuated equilibrium of worldviews, as observed e.g. in real world politics (For example:
Synchronized weakening of liberal democracies and resurgence of nationalism are such transitions observed within the last
decade). Therefore, in the age of online social networks and echo chambers, it is imperative to take up the challenges associated
with recommendation algorithms and choice architecture2 that can foster more harmonious online and offline social behaviour.
That said, there are a couple of limitations of the proposed model that need to be mentioned, which we plan to do explored
in future work. Firstly, as only one of the human biases is taken into account – namely, confirmation bias, polarization is the
only emergent social phenomenon observed among the agents. Human behavioural choices are in general much more complex,
which leads to wider variety of emergent processes. However, due to the effects of non-linearities, a separate study of each
of these biases and the macroscopic behaviour it generates will underscore the roles of such biases in the overall dynamics.
Secondly, polarization is capable of inducing changes in the social network topology. Therefore, in many scenarios the network
of social influence might change and evolve in time. It is therefore important to develop an understanding of the type rules of
temporal evolution of social influence networks that can drive system into and out of polarized states.
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